ARMY ENGINEERING II - Joint Air To Ground Missile (JAGM) SDD
16 July 2019
MIL -STD -882
is not referenced anywhere else in the SDD.
As I stated earlier safety was not addressed at all by the SDD. The MIL -STD
for System Safety Program Requirements is not even referenced by the SDD other
than to list three of the referenced document which are not even address by the
SDD. Standard Government
engineering. Just a façade with not
substance.
Joint Air To Ground Missile (JAGM) SDD
Software Design Document for the Joint Air To Ground Missile - December
9, 2013 . EDF
No. CS9_SDD-001 Rev A.
Susan, you requested I review this document. I provide
the following comments.
1. Safely is not addressed anywhere in the
SDD. Two documents are referenced for
safety requirements but nowhere in the SDD is safety actually addressed at all.
This is farther documented in #8 below.
2. Supportability
nor sustainability are ever addressed in the SDD.
3. The
SDD is not reference by any of the other documents supplied as the technical
package by Program Management (PM) to support the 2019 release. None at all.
4. I
have to question, which I have already asked you about about in a previous email to you Susan,
that the version provide 2013 which you said is substantiated by the PM as the
current version. Now being 2019 meaning
the document is 6 years old and the original release version, unchanged
reflects the system release being done 6 years later with system changes. Also see issues #8 and #9 below in that the
SDD does not specify any of the versions for the documents references and also
not instantiated (therefore rendering it worthless) for the documents except
for maybe one.
5. SDD
Section “6.0 Requirements Traceability - The Requirements Allocation
Traceability Report, details the Requirements Traceability for each SRS
to the CSC level.” As stated in the
SDD. This document is not provide nor is
the actually document reference or identified anywhere in the SDD. No version is provided either for the 2013
release or the 2019 release.
6. Language
requirements or specifications for are not identified in the SDD.
7. Environment(s)
requirements or specifications for are not identified in the SDD.
8. This
document also address firmware e.g. missile.
The firmware documentation has the same failings identified for
software. So all statements made for
inadequate software documentation equally applies to the firmware. Actually it’s worse than software if that can
even be true.
9. Government
documents listed in Table 2.1-1 of the SDD.
Table 2.1-1.
Government Documents Document #
|
Title
|
MIS-PRF-58345A
|
Performance
Specification For The Joint Air To Ground Missile (JAGM) Guidance Section
|
MIS-ICD-58352
|
JAGM
Missile to Launcher Interface Control Document (ICD)
|
MIS-ICD-56599
|
Joint Air
to Ground Missile (JAGM) Platform to Launcher ICD
|
STANAG 4404
|
NATO
Standardization Agreement (STANAG), Safety Design Requirements and Guidelines
for Munitions Related Safety Critical Computing Systems
|
Military
Standard, System Safety Program Requirements
|
|
Department
of Defense (DoD) Joint System Software Safety Handbook
Version is not specified for any of the documents
referenced in the SDD. Addressing
their instantiate in the SDD in the order listed in Table 2.1-1 above.
|
|
MIS-PRF-58345 document statement “will satisfy the
requirements of JAGM Guidance Section specification MIS-PRF-58345.” First of all there is “will” so not
contractual binding. Although it states
that it will satisfy the requirements I see no evidence in the documents that
it does but quite the opposite. This
document has not been updated in over 6 years.
The document that is supposed to have requirements is not even identified.
This being the only reference to MIS-PRF-58345 in the document. So much actual allocation of those
requirement or traceability in no less the SDD.
MIS-ICD-58352 is referenced in the document:
“The Launcher Interface adheres to the MIS-ICD-58352 for the
JAGM Missile.”
“The HMU stores its information in persistent memory and can
provide it to the launcher upon request per MIS-ICD-58352.”
“All CSC ’s are reuse from
legacy programs or previous phases of this program, with the exception of HMU
which is new and the Launcher interface, which adheres to a new MIS-ICD-58352.”
Doesn’t this conflict with the last
statement?
“The Launcher Interface is responsible for communicating
with the launchers and implementing the following Interface Control Document
(ICD): MIS-ICD-58352.”
Three (3) requirements as specified above for interface, two
of which conflict. Clearing nailing down
the interface.
MIS-ICD-56599 is not referenced anywhere else in the
SDD.
STANAG 4404 is not referenced anywhere else in the SDD.
Department of Defense (DoD) Joint System Software Safety
Handbook of course is not referenced anywhere else in the SDD. Not referenced by the SDD bring the total to
four technical requirement documents references not even address by the
SDD. Standard Government
engineering. Just a façade with not
substance. Both of which are Safety
that not address at all by the SDD.
10. Government documents listed in Table 2.1-1. Listed in
the SDD.
2.2 Non-Government Documents
Non-government documents are listed in Table 2.2-1.
Table 2.2-1. Non-Government Documents Document #
|
Title
|
CS9_
|
Software Development Plan
|
MIS-PRF-57710
|
MP CSCI Software Requirements Specification (
|
MIS-PRF-57711
|
IT CSCI
|
MIS-PRF-57713
|
|
MIS-PRF-57712
|
RP CSCI
|
MIS-PRF-57725
|
Guidance Electronics Unit (GEU)
|
MIS-PRF-57714
|
Gimbal Control Processor (GCP) CSCI
|
MIS-PRF-57726
|
Seeker Section
|
MIS-PRF-57717
|
Integrated Flight Simulation (
|
Not a single one of this documents are address or
instantiated in the SDD other than to reference them in this table rending them
worthless. Standard Government
engineering. Just a façade of
engineering with absolutely no substance.
A totally inadequate technical document that was previously
used to release the 2013 system and now the same document unchanged is being
used to support a 2019 system release.
The SDD does not address safety or supportability or sustainability in
any way. Nothing on languages or
environments. The SDD provides
absolutely no traceability. Not even
specifying what the SDD is required to meet but good enough for the system to
be released by the Army in 2013 and good enough unchanged from 2013 to release
a modification to the system 6 years later.
Bad the first time so let’s reuse the same bad documentation again! Without any changes although the new release
represents a system mod! Standard bad Army engineering. Not
once but twice.
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