Javelin Missile MIS-42597W 29 April 2016 Mission Critical Computer Resource (MCCR) CSCI Pt II

Susan requested I review the MIS-42597W 29 April 2016 Mission Critical Computer Resource (MCCR) CSCI of the Javelin Antitank Weapon System.  Which I did and provided in writing (30 July 2019) to her via open email.  Shortly thereafter in a meeting in her office with two of the other engineers that also worked the Javelin I went over my comments.   Going over my findings she was quite apparently appalled just how bad the documentation actually was being very evident by her expressions. 

From the write-up: (small part of)

4.1 – Qualification Methods – “assigns a qualification method and a qualification level for each testable element. The validation of stated engineering requirements shall occur at the highest level that is practical for determining conformance to those requirements. The validation”…. See next comment.  This raised major issues with the document in that the justification for the Qualification Method and Level assigned for ALL requirements, including safety Critical.

            This leads to a very disturbing issue about the document in that it is really only a summary.  Since it never addresses the Qualification Method assigned.  They are assigned as stated.  So there is no visibility or traceability to the reasons or rational for the Qualification Method assigned by the document.  Hence the position that the document itself actually represents a summary of MCCR CSCI Qualification Traceability or the just the matrix as stated by the document itself. 

4.1.1.3 – Qualification Method. – “The methods for validating the identified requirements” Demonstration – Inspection – Analysis – Simulation – which is all we have for the method selection.

4.1.1.3 – Qualification Method – I would argue that they are verifying not validating, as stated in the document.

           

4.1.1.4 - Qualification Levels – Just as with Qualification methods the document assigns levels for all the identified requirements.  As with the previous qualification Methods there is no traceability for the assignments.   The document doesn’t address Unit or CSC testing.  Note that CSC - Computer Software Configuration Component for the CSCI itself is only addressed once in the document but used extensively.  As is Unit, Demonstration, Inspection, Analysis, and Simulation.  Once again indicating the actual summary nature of this document.

Other comment:

8.           Actual code coverage by testing is never addressed or qualified.

Special Mention:

4.1.1.2 Description - A brief description of each requirement is given based on engineering judgment of the essence of the requirement.   [essence - tragically funny! but official Army approved technical documentation for the Javelin]

The point being this document represents a MAJOR requirement specification for the Javelin missile system neither provides or has absolutely any requirements traceability.   None!  Even Susan realized the impacts expressed by her ghostly pail expression and actually stating this fact to the bystanders in the meeting who did not comprehend or realize the impact made evident by answering a question that clearly showed they didn't understand the ramification or have a clue.   She openly acknowledged this by answering their question substantiating this fact to them by stating there was absolutely no requirements traceability in the document:  the Mission Critical Computer Resource (MCCR) CSCI of the Javelin Antitank Weapon System. 

If that wasn't bad enough wait there's more!  What does the Army do?  The norm of course which is absolutely nothing (the Army had already approved the document) but it gets even worse.  Susan Davis then knowingly proceeds to supervise the use of this horrible documentation to generate equally horrible technical documentation (coping the same crap) to enable the program to movie forward by generating and "checking off" on an Army required program document.  Of course this is nothing new for the Army, standard practice really.  I'll expand on her facilitation of Army bad engineering in the next post.